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FOREWORD

In line with policies long in place in Western Europe, United States disability policy is now
attempting to intervene directly in the labor market to increase the employment of people with
disabilities. Beginning in July, 1992, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 required employers
to provide reasonable accommodation to workers with disabilities. Here we use a continuous time
hazard model on retrospective data from the 1978 Social Security Survey of Disability and Work to
estimate the effect of employer accommodation on the subsequent job tenure of workers who suffer a work
limiting health impairment. We show that the risk of leaving one's employer is significantly
influenced both by accommodation and by the Social Security Disability Insurance replacement rate.
Accommodation appears to be as important as a worker's expected replacement rate in influencing his
risk of job exit.
This research was supported by a research award granted to Kim by the Arthritis Foundation and
part of the work was completed while Burkhauser was a Fellow at The Netherlands Institute for Advanced
Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences. The authors thank George A. Slotsve, Kathryn H. Anderson
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Korea, Seoul, Korea.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF EMPLOYER ACCOMMODATION ON THE
JOB DURATION OF WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES:
A HAZARD MODEL APPROACH

Dissatisfaction over the poor employment experience of people with disabilities has resulted
in the implementation of major new legislation aimed at dramatically increasing their market work
through mandated job accommodation. Direct market intervention either through quotas (Germany),
government subsidized jobs (Sweden), or subsidies for accommodation (The Netherlands), have long been
a part of disability policy in Western European countries.1 Despite the fact that the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) is now in force, and expectations about its influence on employment are
high, little is known about its likely impact on the population with disabilities. For instance, no
systematic evidence has been presented to determine the level of accommodation prior to passage of the
ADA or to show the efficacy of accommodation as a means of increasing the employment of workers with
disabilities.
Here data from the 1978 Survey of Disability and Work is used to trace the ability of workers to
continue on the job following the onset of a health condition that affects their ability to work.
Using life table analysis, the risk of exit from an employer following onset is shown and then a hazard
model is used to estimate the influence of economic variables on that risk.
This data set is of particular value in gauging the potential success of accommodation because
it includes data on the incidence of employer accommodation in the workplace prior to the passage of
the ADA.2 We show that contrary to the characterization of irrationally discriminating employers
drawn by the anecdotal evidence presented at the ADA hearings, a substantial minority of private
employers accommodated workers before passage of the ADA. More important, we argue that such
accommodation did significantly increase the expected job duration of workers with disabilities but
that the ADA is unlikely to be a full employment panacea for all people with disabilities.
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The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
Full employment of people with disabilities is an important but elusive policy goal. Nearly 90
percent of able-bodied men were in the labor force in the United States in 1988, but only about 35
percent of men with work disabilities were (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1989). Burkhauser, Haveman, and
Wolfe (forthcoming) estimate that the real earnings of working age men with disabilities were less
than one-half that of able-bodied men in 1987.
A further indication of the difficulty of achieving this employment goal is that virtually no
one returns to work once they are on either Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) or Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), the two major transfer programs targeted on people with disabilities in the
United States. The potential employment picture for this population is made even gloomier by the Bound
(1989, 1991) findings that under 30 percent of unsuccessful disability applicants were subsequently
employed and that only about two-fifths of them were working full time.
Why the work experience of the population with disabilities is so poor is an unsettled
question. By definition, workers with disabilities have health conditions which impede to some degree
their ability to work. But other factors influence whether health conditions result in reduced work.
Most economic research has concentrated on the supply side of the market. Parsons (1980, 1991), for
instance, argues that the labor supply of older workers with health conditions is highly sensitive to
the reward structure of the DI system relative to wage earnings. Other researchers have found that the
expected replacement rate of DI benefits influences labor supply but to a much smaller degree. (See
Haveman, de Jong, and Wolfe, 1991, for a recent paper on this subject and Leonard, 1986, and Wolfe,
1987, for reviews of this literature. Aarts and De Jong (1992) provide the only systematic results
outside the United States in their analysis of The Netherlands.3
Economic research has concentrated much less on demand: yet it is this side of the market that
advocacy groups for people with disabilities believe is most responsible for the poor work experience
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of those with disabilities.4 This view dominated congressional testimony on the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990. (For a summary of this testimony see: U.S. Senate, 1989.)
In the extreme, advocates of this demand side perspective hold that people with disabilities
have characteristics that distinguish them from the able-bodied, and on the basis of these
characteristics, they are discriminated against. Just as one would not cure racial discrimination by
making blacks white, the solution to discrimination against people with disabilities does not lie in
having them conform to the demands of the marketplace by, for instance, reducing their functional
limitations. Rather the solution is to mandate changes in the network of private market relationships
that prevent this minority from being fully integrated in the first place.
The ADA became fully operational in July 1992 for employers of 25 or more people and will
include employers of 15 or more people in July 1993. It is meant to reduce discrimination against
people with disabilities. It is a compromise from the extreme position that accommodation for all jobs
is a right possessed by workers regardless of their impairment. While this legislation extends
coverage against discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to employees of private firms, it
also contains language that explicitly recognizes that substantial expenditures may be necessary to
accommodate fully people with disabilities and that this type of accommodation is different from that
necessary to integrate blacks or women. Thus, in Title 1 of the ADA, which outlines the legal
responsibilities of firms to workers with disabilities, employers are obliged to make only reasonable
accommodations that would not create an undue hardship on the operation of business.
An innovative feature of this legislation is its emphasis on changing the workplace
environment. Table 1 shows that almost two-thirds of beneficiaries of DI are between the ages of 50
and 64. Over one-half are that age when they enter the program. Hence, it is likely that the majority
of people with disabilities of working age were able-bodied for most of their lives.
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For this reason the timing of policy interventions to encourage work may be an important issue.
Substantial time may elapse between the onset of a health condition, its first impact on work
performance, job exit, and application for disability benefits. For instance, for workers with
chronic musculoskeletal conditions, the third most common disease group cited by DI recipients, see
Table 1, the journey to total disability is likely to be quite lengthy.
Furthermore applying for disability benefits is a risky gamble on which the outcome can be
delayed for years. In 1985 only one in three applications was successful (U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, 1987). Applicants for benefits must "invest" in not being able to work to maximize
their chances in an often long review process.5 Hence, the Bound (1989) finding that even unsuccessful
applicants are unlikely to return to work does not rule out the possibility that they would have been
working if intervention occurred earlier in the disability process.
Proponents of the ADA believe this Act will increase employer willingness to change the work
environment both to accommodate new workers with disabilities and to prolong the worklife of employed
workers who suffer health conditions that otherwise would lead them to leave their job. Because it is
likely that the majority of those with disabilities were employed at the time of onset of their work
limiting condition, how the ADA impacts on this group of workers will primarily determine its success
in increasing work among those with disabilities.
Unfortunately, little systematic evidence was presented at the ADA hearing to document the
degree to which employer discrimination is responsible for the poor labor market experience of people
with disabilities. Nor was evidence provided on the percentage of such workers accommodated by their
employers or the degree that accommodation prolongs tenure with the firm. This paper is a first
attempt to fill part of the void by measuring the importance of accommodation on the job duration of
workers with health impairments and by gauging its likely impact on the employment of the population
with disabilities.

5
Data
The most recent nationally representative, economics based data set containing information on
workers with disabilities is the 1978 Survey of Disability and Work. This survey of the prevalence of
work disabilities in the working age population was conducted by the Social Security Administration.
It consists of two frames, a Health Interview Survey (HIS) frame and a Social Security Administration
(SSA) frame. The HIS frame of 5,652 persons is representative of the general population of noninstitutionalized persons age 18 to 64.
Respondents were asked to identify any health conditions they had and to indicate the time that
the condition first limited their ability to work. Additional retrospective information on their
labor market activity at the time of onset and subsequent to it was asked. In addition, the survey data
were matched with social security earning records. These data contain the yearly earnings of workers
since 1951 and their quarters of coverage since 1938.
Combining these two data sets, we are able to trace employment histories of workers with
chronic health conditions from the time the condition began to limit work until they left their
employer. In our empirical model, the behavior of prime age men, who were less than age 60 at the
survey date and older than age 20 at onset, is analyzed.6 Because we are interested in evaluating the
response of employers, we limit our analysis to non-self-employed men who were employed at the onset of
their work limitation.7 Men with missing information on either the timing of their work limitation or
their main health condition are deleted. As a result of our selection process we are able to trace the
outcomes of 348 men.
Each respondent was asked the calendar year that his condition first began to limit his work.
So it is a straightforward exercise to measure the year of onset. Unfortunately this is not the case
for measuring duration following onset. Each respondent was asked if he stayed with the firm after
onset. If the respondent changed jobs or stopped working immediately after onset then we know he
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exited in his first post-tenure year. If he stayed with the same employer after onset and was still
employed on that job in 1978, then the time elapsed was from onset to 1978. For all other cases, social
security earnings records are used to estimate job exit by looking for breaks in quarters of coverage
not related to reaching the social security taxable maximum and by comparing drops in wage earnings
relative to previous years.
Job Exit After the Onset of a Work Limiting Health Condition
Disability is a process that begins with the onset of a health condition. Eventually the
condition begins to limit the ability to work and can lead to exit from the job and possibility to
application for disability benefits. In Table 2, we trace a key component in this process--the time
between the onset of a work limiting health condition and separation from an employer.
Table 2 is akin to a life table and measures the risk (hazard rate) of a worker leaving his
employer during each year following the onset of a health condition that limits his ability to work,
given that he survived the previous period. Some workers who were at risk at the beginning of an
interval drop out before its end. The implicit assumption is that attrition from the risk set occurred
randomly during the interval, hence the non-survivors were exposed on average for one-half the
interval.
The time intervals here are measured from the calendar year the condition first started to
affect the person's ability to work. The number of workers falls because of the cumulative effect of
job exits; but also because workers enter the risk set in different calendar years and some are still
working in 1978. Such workers are right censored in different time intervals.
As can be seen in Table 2 the risk of leaving an employer is high in the first two years but
drops substantially thereafter. The risk of leaving the job during the first year is 34 percent, and
it is 34 percent in the next year for those who survive the first year. After two years, less than onehalf of employees with work impairments remain with the firm. After six years only one-quarter remain.
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Our life table assumes that no heterogeneity exists across individuals. More importantly it
assumes the sample composition does not change over time. These are strong assumptions. Part of the
large reduction in the risk of job exit is caused by changes in the composition of survivors. To
specify better the risk of job exit over time, we use a hazard model that adjusts for sample
heterogeneity and allows us to separate the effect of initial characteristics from time effects.
Developing an Empirical Hazard Model
Because we are interested in measuring the time it takes before work impairing health
conditions affect employment, we use a dynamic model of job exit. Our choice is a discrete-state,
continuous-time hazard model. Our model looks explicitly at a worker's risk of leaving his employer
each year. Using this model we capture the distribution in the timing of an event as well as its
occurrence over a specific interval. Most implicitly, we are able to handle right censoring problems
caused by workers with impairments who are still on the job when the survey ends. Ordinary regression
specifications are not well adapted to offsetting censoring problems.
More formally we model the hazard rate as the probability of leaving one's employer following
onset of a work limiting health condition. Suppose the cumulative probability that a person leaves his
onset job by time (t) is given by:
t

G(t) ' 1 & exp & h(u) du
mo

(1)

Associated with this distribution function is the density function:
g(t) ' 1 & G(t)

( h(t)

(2)

describing the likelihood of job exit at time (t). The instantaneous hazard rate is the conditional
probability of leaving the job at (t), given that the person has not left before (t). It is:
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h(t) ' g(t) / 1 & G(t)

(3)

To make the distribution function G(t) a function of individual attributes, we specify the hazard rate
in the form:
h(t) ' h1(x) ( h2(t) ( v

(4)

The first term accounts for observable variation across individuals and is modelled as an exponential
function:
h1(x) ' exp X )b

(5)

The second term shows the time profile to job exit once individual differences are held constant. In
order to allow flexibility we use the quadratic form to capture time dependence:
h2(t) ' exp at % bt 2

(6)

The third term captures unobserved individual heterogeneity. For instance, unobserved heterogeneity
may exist because of omitted variables. Less motivated people will exit jobs more quickly but we are
not able to control completely for attitudes in our sample. Hence, we may confuse negative time
dependence with the fact that in the next period, the remaining sample is dominated by more motivated
people who are less likely to exit. To control for such differences, unobserved factors are integrated
out of the likelihood function. Here we report our findings using a lognormal distribution to control
for unobserved heterogeneity.
For those who leave the onset job, the year of job exit is known. The probability of this event
occurring between ti and (ti + si) is:
Gi (ti % s i ) & Gi (ti )

(7)

Since we know the beginning date of the spell, our measure of duration does not suffer from
left censoring. However, some spells are right censored. In this case we only know that the true
duration of the spell exceeds the observed final value, and hence, the duration is the length of time
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until the end of the survey. For individuals who are still working for the same employer at the time
the survey ends, u, the probability of not leaving the job is:
1 & Gj (tj % u)

(8)

Combining complete and incomplete spell components yields the (M) disabled workers who have left and
the (N) who have not left their onset employer:
M

N

L ' A Gi (ti % s i ) & Gi (ti ) A 1&Gj (tj % u)
i '1

(9)

j '1

Variables Affecting Job Duration
The explanatory variables for (h1(x)) in equation (5) are defined in Table 3. They include
socio-economic and health status variables used in previous studies, as well as a variable unique to
this data set: whether the employer accommodated the worker after his health condition began to affect
his work.
Accommodation.

Because the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 targets job

accommodation as the critical policy variable for increasing the work experience of the disabled, we
are particularly interested in the incidence of such help prior to the passage of the ADA and its
impact on work duration with the firm. We expect accommodation to increase job duration.
Our bivariate measure of accommodation equals one if the employer provided help to the
respondent to remain on the job at the time of onset of his work limiting conditions. In an alternative
specification we model the accommodation decision as well as the decision to leave the job. It is
modeled in a recursive system in which the accommodation decision is made first and that decision
affects the job exit decision. In that model we use an estimated probability of accommodation rather
than the bivariate value in the job exit equation. The results, however, are not credible owning to
high multicollinearity arising from nonlinear identification.
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Replacement Rate.

The Social Security Disability Insurance replacement rate is the key

variable in most economic based studies of the work effort of men with disabilities. If a worker can
recover income lost by conforming to the eligibility rules of DI, he is more likely to leave his job to
do so. Currently, to receive DI benefits a worker must have sufficient quarters of coverage to be
eligible for the program. He must also be unable to perform substantial gainful activity. Roughly,
the test is that a worker must have a physical or mental impairment that has prohibited him from
working for five months and will make it unlikely that he can work for at least one year.
We use the same method developed by other researchers (for instance: Leonard, 1979; Halpern
and Hausman, 1986; and Bound, 1989) to calculate individual replacement rates. We use the social
security formula appropriate in the year of onset to calculate a worker's Average Indexed Monthly
Earnings (AIME) and his Primary Insurance Amount (PIA). We then explicitly recognize that there is
some degree of uncertainty related to acceptance onto the DI rolls by estimating a probit model of DI
acceptance from a subsample of DI applicants. We use DI applicants from the HIS frame of the Survey of
Disability and Work for this purpose. An expected benefit is then calculated for each worker by
multiplying this value by the worker's PIA adjusted for dependents. In obtaining our probability of
acceptance measure we must use those workers who actually applied for benefits. Hence, we may have a
selection problem. By using a bivariate probit model with a selection correction, we are able to check
for possible selection problems. We found no significant selection bias. A detailed discussion of
this work is available in an appendix which will be supplied by the authors upon request.
Our expected replacement rate is the expected value of DI divided by a worker's AIME. We
follow the lead of others in interpreting the AIME as a measure of the worker's permanent wage.
Other Economic Variables.

We would like to hold wealth constant in our model. Unfortunately

little information is available on this variable at the point of onset. We approximate the value by
the use of a binary variable that is positive if the worker had savings at onset. Two other economic
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variables measure job tenure and overall job experience. We expect a long tenured worker to have a
lower risk of job exit since he is likely to have more specific human capital invested in the job and
hence, both the worker and his employer will have more to lose from an exit. We expect this variable to
have a greater impact on retention than overall experience which proxies general as well as specific
human capital.
Other Socio-Economic Variables.

Age at Onset, Marital Status at Onset, Race, and Education

are also included in our empirical model. Marriage, higher education, younger age, and non-black race
are generally found to increase work effort.
Job Characteristics.

Several researchers have looked at the importance of job attributes on

the decision of workers to retire. We report our finding using a binary variable to distinguish white
collar workers, but we also used more elaborate job attribute measures developed by Roos and Treiman
(1980) from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. These measures were used by the Social Security
Administration in their report U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1986). We expect that an
impaired worker in a more physically demanding job has a higher risk of exiting than if he were in a
less demanding job.
Health Measures.

Finally we attempt to account for variations in health within our sample by

accounting for comorbidity and by seeing if different conditions influence duration. We choose the
two most common physical condition among the DI population, cardiovascular and musculoskeletal
conditions. We expect that a worker suffering from multiple conditions is more likely to leave a job
than a worker with only one health condition.
Results
A univariate interval hazard technique allowing for unmeasured heterogeneity was used to
estimate the model. The results are presented in Table 4.
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We find that the risk of job exit after the onset of a work impairing health condition is
significantly reduced when an employer accommodates the worker. This finding is consistent with the
emphasize on accommodation in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. But the fact that 30
percent of workers (see Table 3) in our sample were accommodated by their employer modifies the view
that such accommodation was rare prior to the passage of this Act.8
Consistent with previous research on the participation rate of impaired workers, we find that
a higher expected replacement rate increases the risk of job exit after the onset of a work limiting
condition. This finding differs from previous studies with respect to the sequence of events it
considers; but it is similar in its support of the hypothesis that supply side economic variables
affect the work decision of the health impaired. Our wealth variable, however was not significant.
We also find that longer initial job tenure slows exit. If both employer and employee share
training costs, then both have an incentive to delay a job exit. In contrast, we find overall
experience in the work force has no significant effect on job exit.
Occupation related variables representing physically demanding jobs also have an
insignificant effect. This was true whether our measure was a simple binary variable indicating a
white collar job, as shown here, or the more sophisticated scales of physical requirements of the job
developed by Roos and Treiman (1980). This is a somewhat surprising finding, and it may be that the
variation within these classification schemes is greater than it is across these classification
schemes.
We also find no significant effect in our health measures. This finding should be interpreted
with care. It certainly does not imply that health does not affect job duration. As we will see, the
expected job duration of workers with health impairments is less than that of average workers. All the
men in our sample have a job impairing health condition. Hence, the variation in health is less than in
most other studies of disability. Furthermore, comorbidity may be a poor proxy for severity.

13
Unfortunately, our data contain no independent measures of a worker's functional limitations at the
time his job impairing health condition occurred.
The simple life table reported in Table 2 showed that the risk of job exit fell over time. The
coefficients of time in Table 4 captures time dependence controlled for heterogeneity across workers,
and they are not significant.
Measuring the Relative Importance of Employer Accommodation
Because the ADA emphasizes that accommodation is crucial to achieving greater work experience
for people with disabilities, it is useful to compare the importance of this variable relative to other
policy variables. Using the parameters in the hazard equation in Table 4, we can calculate expected
duration for a worker with mean characteristics. We can then measure the impact of a change in an
independent variable on duration.
Table 5 shows the marginal impact of the four variables found to be significant in Table 4. At
the mean value of all explanatory variables, the calculated expected duration of employment after
onset is 2.9 years.
Accommodation importantly increases a worker's expected duration on the job. The mean worker
who is accommodated has an expected job tenure of over six years compared to 2.15 years for the mean
worker without accommodation, an increase of 3.6 years. Accommodation more than doubles expected work
life. This finding suggests that legislation requiring accommodation has the potential to increase
substantially the employment of people with disabilities.
The importance of this policy parameter is even better seen when compared to the policy
parameter most often measured in disability studies--the expected replacement rate. Using the same
mean value for all other variables, we measure the effect of a change in the expected replacement rate
from zero to one. This dramatic policy counterfactual which captures the full effect of a guaranteed
total replacement of wages for the mean worker versus receiving no benefits reduces expected duration
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by 3.3 years. This value is slightly smaller than the estimated effect of accommodation. However, it
is unlikely that expected replacement rates will ever be allowed to fluctuate to this degree. Hence,
accommodation appears to be a more realistic and more powerful tool for affecting work than does the
replacement rate.
The other two variables modestly change expected job tenure. A one year increase in initial
job tenure increases expected duration by .11 years. A one year increase in age at onset decreases
expected duration by .14 years.
Discussion
Able-bodied working age men are more than two and one-half times as likely to be in the labor
force as men with disabilities of that age. In addition to health differences, it has been argued that
institutional factors cause this disparity in work activity, most especially Social Security
Disability Insurance on the supply side and employer discrimination on the demand side.
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 is an attempt by United States policymakers to
increase the work experience of the disabled by requiring firms to provide accommodation for workers
with disabilities. Unfortunately this Act was passed with little knowledge of whether accommodation
was already taking place and if so, how much it increased the ability of such workers to stay on the
job.
Here we show that 30 percent of the men with disabilities in our sample were accommodated by
their employers at the time they suffered a work limiting health condition. And more importantly, we
show that such help significantly increased their expected job tenure. The mean worker's expected
tenure was more than doubled by accommodation, from 2.5 to 6.1 years with standard errors of 0.9 and
1.3. A marginal increase in accommodation more than offsets a marginal change in expected replacement
rate for the mean worker. But accommodation appears to have a substantially greater potential for
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increasing duration than would decreases in the expected replacement rate, since it is unlikely that
dramatic drops in expected DI benefits are politically acceptable.9
Whether the ADA will substantially increase the willingness of employers to accommodate
handicapped workers remains to be seen. In 1986 The Netherlands passed the Handicapped Workers
Employment Act which mandated that employers accommodate their employees with disabilities. As part
of that Act, employers could claim compensation for the cost of accommodation. But to date, it does
not appear that many employers in Holland have used this option. In contrast to the Dutch policy of
subsidizing accommodation, a driving force in the passage of the ADA was that it mandated help to
people with disabilities at no direct cost to the Federal budget. Firms and their customers must pay
all costs.
Here we have shown that some workers with disabilities were already accommodated prior to the
Act but we have not explained the motives for such accommodation. If the central reason firms did not
accommodate was "rational" discrimination based on an evaluation of its costs against its expected
benefits, then it is unclear how much court imposed accommodation will force firms to tilt toward
accommodation.
Burkhauser (1990) suggests that extending current tax deduction or providing credits is more
likely to achieve accommodation and to do so more efficiently than the arbitrary distribution of cost
and the blunt stick of court enforced compliance stemming from the ADA. But our results should give
further pause to even the most optimistic supporters of this mandate.
It is likely that our health measures do not fully control for the work limitations of our
workers and that the 30 percent of workers who were accommodated in our sample yielded higher returns
per dollar of accommodation cost than non-accommodated workers. As the ADA moves employers toward
universal accommodation, it is very likely that the returns to accommodation will fall. It is also
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likely that the average duration of accommodated workers will also fall as those with more serious
impairments are included.10
But even if this very likely result does not occur, accommodation while significantly
increasing job duration will not be an employment panacea. We find that the average worker leaves his
employer less than three years after the occurrence of a work impairing health condition. In our
sample, the average worker was age 38 at onset. Even with complete compliance the average work
impaired man will still leave his employer after about six years, which is about one-third the expected
employment duration of an average worker of this age (Smith, 1985). Accommodation will significantly
delay the job exit for men with work impairments but it is very likely that such workers will still
experience substantial wage losses prior to normal retirement age that will require health related
income transfers to mitigate.
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Endnotes

1.

See Burkhauser and Hirvonen (1988) for a discussion of disability policy in Germany and Sweden
and Aarts and de Jong (1992) for a discussion of disability policy in The Netherlands.

2.

Our measure of accommodation is limited to a self-report by the employee with respect to
whether his employer provided help to him in remaining on his job at the time of onset of his
work limitation. Such subjective responses are subject to measurement error. Ideal data
would also provide information on the costs of potential accommodation for all workers at the
onset of a work limiting health condition. In the absence of a major new data initiative, the
1978 Survey continues to be the best available data set for measuring the impact of
accommodation and other policy variables on the work experiences of Americans with
disabilities.

3.

A parallel literature on Workers' Compensation has found that injury rates, claims frequency,
and time off work following injury vary directly with Workers' Compensation benefits. See
Worrall and Butler (1986) for a review of this literature.

4.

An exception in the economics literature is Johnson and Lambrinos (1985) which attempts to
measure the part of the wage difference between the handicapped and the able-bodied that is
caused by discrimination. Their study does not consider the importance of discrimination on
employment. In the health literature Nagi (1976) and Yelin et al. (1980) use cross-section
data to show that job modifications by employers increase the likelihood that a disabled
worker will continue to work.

5.

See Weaver (1986) for a discussion of the DI determination and appeals process.

6.

We limit our sample to those under age 60 in 1978 to factor out job exit risks associated with
reaching retirement age for social security or employer pensions. We also want to exclude
those with little or no work history prior to onset so we excluded those below age 20 at onset.

7.

We also exclude government employees because they were not covered by social security until
the 1980s.

8.

In an alternative specification that relaxes our implicit assumption that accommodation is
exogenously determined, we modelled accommodation and job exit within a recursive framework.
Our results, found in Appendix Table 1-A, are that neither accommodation nor replacement rate
is significant in the job exit equation. No variables are significant at the 5 percent level
in the accommodation equation, including our health variables. We believe these results are
caused by the strong collinearity between estimated accommodation and the other key variables
in the job exit equation.

9.

See Weaver (1986) for a discussion of the Congressional response to Administration attempts to
tighten disability standards in the early 1980s.

10.

See footnote 8.

TABLE 1
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM
All Beneficiariesa
Diagnostic Groups

Below Age 50

Mental Disorders

Aged 50 to 64

Newly Enrolledb
All

BelowAge 50

Aged50 to 60

All

43.2

17.1

26.7

32.0

9.6

19.5

7.1

26.5

19.3

9.5

26.0

18.5

Musculoskeletal

12.1

22.2

18.5

11.1

18.7

15.3

All Others

37.6

34.2

35.5

47.4

45.7

46.7

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Circulatory Disease

Total
Total (in millions)
Total (in percent)
a

1.04
36.9

1.78
63.1

2.82
100.0

0.19
44.4

0.23
55.6

As of December 1988
In 1987

b

SOURCE:
Derived from tables in the Annual Statistical Supplement of the Social Security Bulletin (1989).

0.42
100.0

TABLE 2
HAZARD OF LEAVING A JOB FOLLOWING THE ONSET
OF A WORK LIMITING HEALTH CONDITION
Years Since Onset

a

NumberEnteringthe
Intervala

Hazard Rate

Cumulative
Survival Rate

1

348

.34

.66

2

221

.34

.44

3

131

.17

.36

4

102

.18

.29

5

76

.10

.27

6

57

.08

.25

Sample size falls below 50 after 6 years.

SOURCE: Data from the 1978 Survey of Disability and Work.

TABLE 3
DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES AND THE SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE SAMPLE
Variables
Definitions

Sample
Mean

Standard
Error

Accommodation

Equals 1 if at onset of work limitation the employer provided help to
respondent to remain on the job, otherwise 0

0.30

0.46

Replacement Rate

(expected PIA)/AIME

0.31

0.20

Had Savings

Equals 1 if a worker had savings at onset, otherwise 0.

0.47

0.50

Job Tenure

Years of job tenure at the job prior to work limitation.

9.76

8.86

Experience

Quarters of coverage in all covered employment prior to work
limitation.

66.9

36.7

Age at Onset

Age at onset.

39.8

10.0

Married at Onset

Equals 1 if married, otherwise 0.

0.78

0.41

Nonwhite

Equals 1 if nonwhite, otherwise 0.

0.18

0.39

Education

Years of formal education

White Collar

Equals 1 if occupation at onset is professional or managerial,
otherwise 0.

0.17

0.37

Comorbidity

Equals 1 if respondent had multiple health conditions at onset,
otherwise 0.

0.70

0.46

Cardiovascular

Equals 1 if main health condition is one of cardiovascular disease
group, otherwise 0.

0.22

0.41

Musculoskeletal

Equals 1 if main health condition is one of musculoskeletal disease
group, otherwise 0.

0.44

0.50

10.3

3.55

TABLE 4
ESTIMATED HAZARD OF JOB EXIT
Hazard Model
With Unmeasured Heterogeneity
Explanatory Variables
Constant

Coefficient

t-Value

0.48

0.67

-1.19*

-4.55

Replacement Rate

1.09*

2.38

Had Savingsa

0.06

0.33

Job Tenureb

-3.60*

-2.60

Experiencea

-0.39

-0.91

Accommodation

Age at Onset
Married at Onset

0.48*

3.11

-0.37

-1.61

Nonwhite

0.34

1.32

Education

-0.23

-0.68

White Collar

-0.18

-0.62

Comorbidity

-0.06

-0.33

Cardiovasculara

-0.06

-0.02

Musculoskeletal

-0.13

-0.66

Timea

0.12

0.11

Time Squarea

0.13

0.32

Variance of Unmeasured Heterogeneity

0.75

0.87

*

Significant at 1 percent
Coefficient values are multiplied by 10.
b
Coefficient values are multiplied by 100.
a

TABLE 5
MARGINAL IMPACT OF KEY VARIABLE ON
CONTINUED EMPLOYMENTa
ExplanatoryVariable
Mean

Marginal Impact
(years)

t-Value

Accommodationb

0.3

3.59

+3.64

Replacement Ratec

0.3

-3.28

-2.20

Job Tenured

9.7

0.11

2.37

39.8

-0.14

-2.83

Age at Onsete
a

Mean expected duration is 2.9 years.
The marginal impact is an estimate of a change from zero to one.
c
Expected replacement rate is measured as the change from 0 to 1.
d
Job tenure is measured as the addition of one more year.
e
Age at onset is measured as the addition of one more year.
b
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